Apollo 11 LM roles

[Chew]

I haven't been in the military either, but my conversations with those who have suggests that passing the buck (more American slang) down to subordinates is as common there as it is anywhere else. 

My experience in the US Navy submarine service was the exact opposite. Sh!t ran in the appropriate direction. If a subordinate intentionally disobeyed a regulation then he was punished. If it was an inexperienced subordinate making an honest mistake his supervisor was reprimanded for failing to properly supervise him. A supervisor who tried to blame a subordinate for his screw up were considered a dirtbag and quickly dropped in professional reputation.

[Ranb]

The commanding officer of an American military ship has more authority/responsibility than the pilot of a single seat aircraft.  He or she is responsible for safe operation of the ship and the conduct of the crew at sea and ashore.  The CO can delegate authority but not responsibility.  If a ship runs aground, not only are the navigator and helmsman directly liable, the CO is also because he is required to ensure that the crew is properly trained.  If a crewman was improperly trained or supervised, the crewman may escape punishment while their superiors do not.

I know of at least one incident on one of my submarines where a junior Sailor improperly rigged a hatch for sea which resulted in a seawater leak while submerged.  He was not completely at fault because he had not been trained properly and used an improperly generated procedure.  He was not punished even though it did much damage to the ship.

Ranb

[Chew]

If a ship runs aground, not only are the navigator and helmsman directly liable

What navy was this in? I had never heard of a submarine helmsman being held liable for any grounding. They can't even see where they are going or where they are on the chart.

I know of at least one incident on one of my submarines where a junior Sailor improperly rigged a hatch for sea which resulted in a seawater leak while submerged.  He was not completely at fault because he had not been trained properly and used an improperly generated procedure.  He was not punished even though it did much damage to the ship.

Ranb

Wasn't it second-checked by someone else???

[Ranb]

I was thinking more of the surface Navy when making the helmsmen comment.  I seem to recall that when the USS Greenville hit the Japanese fishing vessel, the entire control room section got called on the carpet; I could be wrong though.

The seawater leak incident involved us (637 class) picking up riders in the Pearl Harbor turning basin then going back out to sea.  The E-3 rigged the hatch for surfacing and drained it in accordance with how he was trained.  He used the weapons shipping hatch drain valves and the DDS (no DDS on that trip) drain valves to prep the hatch for opening.  After the PersTrans he rigged the hatch for dive using the hatch's rig for dive bill which did not include the DDS drain system valves he had opened previously.  The CPO who second checked the rig for dive did not know the other valves were opened and did not check them, he only checcked the valves on the rig for dive.  The DDS drain line was isolated and the gageglass broke when diving deep as it was not rated for submerged running.  It was a comedy of errors that we fixed by reviewing every rig for dive bill on the boat and finding many problem.

[Chew]

I was thinking more of the surface Navy when making the helmsmen comment.  I seem to recall that when the USS Greenville hit the Japanese fishing vessel, the entire control room section got called on the carpet; I could be wrong though.

Many were reprimanded but not the helmsman.

What was your rate? I started as a QM then got merged into ET.

The seawater leak incident involved us (637 class) picking up riders in the Pearl Harbor turning basin then going back out to sea.  The E-3 rigged the hatch for surfacing and drained it in accordance with how he was trained.  He used the weapons shipping hatch drain valves and the DDS (no DDS on that trip) drain valves to prep the hatch for opening.  After the PersTrans he rigged the hatch for dive using the hatch's rig for dive bill which did not include the DDS drain system valves he had opened previously.  The CPO who second checked the rig for dive did not know the other valves were opened and did not check them, he only checcked the valves on the rig for dive.  The DDS drain line was isolated and the gageglass broke when diving deep as it was not rated for submerged running.  It was a comedy of errors that we fixed by reviewing every rig for dive bill on the boat and finding many problem.

I feel your pain. I served on the Seawolf. When I checked onboard my division had 8 CASREPs that had been active for over a year. By the time I left 3 of those had been cleared and I added about 10 more that were active for over a year when I transferred. When they cancelled the class, they cancelled support for them. Terminal boards didn't match the drawings, everything was labeled wrong, PMS cards called for operating valves that didn't exist and vice versa. Almost every PMS card had a feedback report submitted for it. The Seawolf and the Connecticut were transferred to Washington to basically act as spare parts boats for the Jimmy Carter.

[Ranb]

I was the LELT on the Wm H. Bates back then.  The seawater leak trashed radio, ruined the OX's laptop and even got the RAM in Nucleonics wet.  I am at PSNS right now and preparing to fix a pump on the SSN-21.  It is still called the Pierwolf and not for nothing. 

Ranb

[Chew]

I was the LELT on the Wm H. Bates back then.  The seawater leak trashed radio, ruined the OX's laptop and even got the RAM in Nucleonics wet.  I am at PSNS right now and preparing to fix a pump on the SSN-21.  It is still called the Pierwolf and not for nothing. 

Ranb

Ah, back in the day when Nucleonics was in Conerland. When were you on the Billy Bates?

[Obviousman]

I've been in the Australian Navy (RAN) for over 20 years, both as a skimmer and as a birdie. Perhaps it is different because I'm an Officer, but I've seen subordinates held accountable for their actions and I have seen COs cashieried because the system they supervised allowed people to screw up. I don't believe for a second it is a perfect system. For example, there was the case of an aircraft that developed a fault inflight. The checklist actions said "Land as soon as possible". The crew had a good level of experience and discussed the situation. They all agreed it was preferable to land aboard the ship, about 10nm away rather than land at a coalition base 2 or 3nm away which had no support for them whatsoever. They safely recovered to the ship, the defect was rectified and the aircraft was flying the next day.

Senior personnel then tried to have the AC charged because they did not land at the nearest base. A risk adverse culture tried to stifle people getting experience.

Anyway, for the most part, people responsible get held accountable (unless you are in politics).

[ka9q]

They all agreed it was preferable to land aboard the ship, about 10nm away rather than land at a coalition base 2 or 3nm away which had no support for them whatsoever. They safely recovered to the ship, the defect was rectified and the aircraft was flying the next day.

And yet it could have turned out very differently. This was exactly the choice faced by that F-18 pilot and his commanders when they chose to fly him directly over North Island NAS and land him at Miramar MCAS. They chose wrong and four civilians, two houses and a 40-50 million dollar airplane were all destroyed.

Using Google Earth, I drew a line along the direction of the crash (as established by the ground scar and the pilot's landing point) until it intersected the extension of the main Miramar runway. They did so over a local elementary school. That's where he turned in his unsuccessful attempt to crash in a canyon just beyond the crash site. Had he not turned, he would have crashed about a block from my house.

So I take decisions like these a little personally.

[Ranb]

Ah, back in the day when Nucleonics was in Conerland. When were you on the Billy Bates?

Let's see, boot camp in 1983, Tautog 84-87 (HI and Puget), ELT school in 1987, Jacksonville 87-89, RCM school in 89 then on to R-5 89-92, Bates 92-95, Cavalla 95-97.  Crushed my ankle in 97 falling off of a waterfall at Maakua Gulch, 16 months to recover then to RCT school then shore duty at Bangor, then put on permanent disabled list in 2003. 

Stupid me I planned my career 4 years at a time.  Fell in love in the PI in 1986, married my honeyco, got divorced, married my Thai gf and am living happily ever after.

Ranb

[Chew]

So you were around for the QM/ET/IC merger. I'm still trying to figure that one out.

[Obviousman]

They all agreed it was preferable to land aboard the ship, about 10nm away rather than land at a coalition base 2 or 3nm away which had no support for them whatsoever. They safely recovered to the ship, the defect was rectified and the aircraft was flying the next day.

And yet it could have turned out very differently. This was exactly the choice faced by that F-18 pilot and his commanders when they chose to fly him directly over North Island NAS and land him at Miramar MCAS. They chose wrong and four civilians, two houses and a 40-50 million dollar airplane were all destroyed.

Using Google Earth, I drew a line along the direction of the crash (as established by the ground scar and the pilot's landing point) until it intersected the extension of the main Miramar runway. They did so over a local elementary school. That's where he turned in his unsuccessful attempt to crash in a canyon just beyond the crash site. Had he not turned, he would have crashed about a block from my house.

So I take decisions like these a little personally.

No, it was not. You are generalising without knowing the specifics of the incident. They made a good (note: not right, just good) decision. I didn't mention that we changed the checklist item to read "Land as soon as practicable" not long after the incident.

[ka9q]

That's right, you didn't give me the specifics of the incident or explain why the standing rule was "land as soon as practicable." So that didn't distinguish it from the 2008 San Diego F-18 crash, which broke many rules -- including "land as soon as practicable".

If you can show me that not landing as soon as practicable, in the context of your fault, could not increase the risk of crashing in a populated area, then your point is entirely valid.

[Obviousman]

It was changed from "Land as soon as possible" to "Land as soon as practicable".

They were overwater, the US base was on a headland to the right or they could continue further out to sea and go back to the boat. They used AVRM and sound judgement.

[ka9q]

Well, if the choice was to go out to sea rather than over land, then they could not have endangered the civilian population and I cannot disagree with that call. Military aviators voluntarily accept the risks of their jobs; the civilians around them do not.