Hiroshima and Nagasaki

[Tedward]

Reading a few memoirs of soldiers that fought across the Pacific is certainly a definite for people wanting to understand this and the Antipodean comedian could much to better his education in looking at this. He could also look up what happened on something closer to his abode, the Kokoda Trail.

Of the examples that are many in these and many more events in this history, what I have got from it, the Japanese soldiers fought to the last in general and in a way to maximise damage to the attackers. Changes in tactics from full frontal Samurai charges changed to luring in the attackers then getting nasty even when they knew they would not survive.

The Europeans fought until a position was untenable then surrendered or retreated, in general (and in no way intended to belittle anyone from any side here and yes there were other actions) Although it got very personal on the Eastern front but that was for other reasons.

Looking at the casualty figures and numbers of prisoners should be obvious for the fellow with a penchant for youtube diatribe.

If I have anything wrong then point it out, still learning (from books not internet).

Been holding off a few more books on the subject for a while due to the nature of them

[gillianren]

The thing is, a lot of my reading suggests that the Japanese government was pretty well on the verge of collapse even before the bombings.  Yes, the generals attempted a coup rather than surrender, even after the official decision was made, but evidence strongly suggests that, if the offer had been made before the bombing to allow the Japanese to keep their emperor (which was part of the final peace but not permitted by the terms issued before the bombing), the Japanese government would most likely have agreed to surrender before the bombs were dropped.  What's more, there is a strong suggestion that the US government knew that.  It's also certainly true that the targets chosen were civilian targets.  Deliberately so.  They were looking for a target that hadn't really been bombed yet, which left out all the truly military targets.

[Tedward]

I suppose there are a few views. My understanding is they wanted to hold out for a treaty they wanted. That is holding as much as they could, reclaiming gains etc. They saw themselves as the rightful ruler of the Pacific and far east, and not in a benign way. Atrocities are many and well documented.

Another thing they wanted was to force a landing from the allies if it came to it and that would bog the allies down and get them to the table, again after their version of a treaty. Another fear is the longer it went on, the greater the world would see Japan as the oppressed and try to force the US into a treaty they did not want. Also Stalin started a land grab, and Churchill knew what threat he was.

Sitting here many years down the line, I can only imagine the commanders had a tough choice, the one they made is history. Given what they knew then, it was a big bomb, a means to an end.

[bknight]

The thing is, a lot of my reading suggests that the Japanese government was pretty well on the verge of collapse even before the bombings.  Yes, the generals attempted a coup rather than surrender, even after the official decision was made, but evidence strongly suggests that, if the offer had been made before the bombing to allow the Japanese to keep their emperor (which was part of the final peace but not permitted by the terms issued before the bombing), the Japanese government would most likely have agreed to surrender before the bombs were dropped.

I would tend to agree with this, the main hang-up during negotiations was the Emperor.  It is speculation though because it didn't happen that way.

It's also certainly true that the targets chosen were civilian targets.  Deliberately so.  They were looking for a target that hadn't really been bombed yet, which left out all the truly military targets.

You are correct here, but the implications are murky.  The targets selected had no previous bombing so that the scientist/military brass could evaluate precisely what damage had been done by the bomb.  Since as you note, there were no military targets available that had the undamaged nature, other targets were chosen.  But they were chosen not because they were civilian but that was all that was left.

What's more, there is a strong suggestion that the US government knew that.

Your readings should have included the US had materials to build three weapons.  One was used in the initial test, the other two were used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  This is pure speculation on my part, but it seems reasonable to me that once you are out the ultimate bomb and no word comes form the Japanese, what to do? Truman "promised" a reign of bombs like of which had never happened before(words to that effect), but no bombs existed and to build more would take months.  So what is Truman likely to do?  Delete the part concerning the Emperor and see if that would allow a graceful surrender.  Truman knew the casualty rates in the recent operations and I can't believe he would have wanted the continuation of the war if a quicker end was available.

[Chew]

You are correct here, but the implications are murky.  The targets selected had no previous bombing so that the scientist/military brass could evaluate precisely what damage had been done by the bomb.

That is not entirely accurate. Nagasaki had been bombed previously several times. It was not on the list of cities to be spared because it was never designated as a primary target for a nuke. It was nuked because it had been the secondary target. Kokura had been the primary target on that day but Kokura was obscured by clouds and smoke from a nearby bombed city and the crew had orders to drop the bomb visually. (Incidentally, Kokura had been the secondary target for the first bomb.)

Your readings should have included the US had materials to build three weapons.  One was used in the initial test, the other two were used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

That is entirely not accurate. The next bomb would have been ready to drop by August 17, and three bombs per month would have been ready for September, October, and November, with production ramping up after that, and by mid-1946 up to a dozen bombs could have been produced each month.

[bknight]

You are correct here, but the implications are murky.  The targets selected had no previous bombing so that the scientist/military brass could evaluate precisely what damage had been done by the bomb.

That is not entirely accurate. Nagasaki had been bombed previously several times. It was not on the list of cities to be spared because it was never designated as a primary target for a nuke. It was nuked because it had been the secondary target. Kokura had been the primary target on that day but Kokura was obscured by clouds and smoke from a nearby bombed city and the crew had orders to drop the bomb visually. (Incidentally, Kokura had been the secondary target for the first bomb.)

Yes you are quite correct, it was a secondary target, but not the primary.  It was chosen by the cloud cover obscuring the target area. 

Your readings should have included the US had materials to build three weapons.  One was used in the initial test, the other two were used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

That is entirely not accurate. The next bomb would have been ready to drop by August 17, and three bombs per month would have been ready for September, October, and November, with production ramping up after that, and by mid-1946 up to a dozen bombs could have been produced each month.

I have read that, but I had one of the physicist for the project as a teacher(don't ask, I can't remember his name 50 yrs. ago) He indicated that they were months away from completion of another weapon.  And then you have to add the month travel time to the Pacific theater.  Subsequent they maybe could have produced the amount you quoted.

[twik]

The thing is, a lot of my reading suggests that the Japanese government was pretty well on the verge of collapse even before the bombings.  Yes, the generals attempted a coup rather than surrender, even after the official decision was made, but evidence strongly suggests that, if the offer had been made before the bombing to allow the Japanese to keep their emperor (which was part of the final peace but not permitted by the terms issued before the bombing), the Japanese government would most likely have agreed to surrender before the bombs were dropped.

I have problems with this line of thinking, which is very much "wise after the fact". Throughout the course of the war (if not human existence), one side has received intelligence about the other side. It's rarely clear or comprehensive, and to say that they "knew" the Japanese were about ready to surrender is hindsight. At the start of the war, people "knew" Hitler was a blowhard who would crumble if shown any real resistance. They "knew" Japan had neither the will nor the strength to attack the U.S.

The most the U.S. could have known about Japan at the time of the bombing was that there was a strong undercurrent that wanted to end the war, one way or another, because they knew it was lost. If things had played out differently, we might now have writers complaining that the U.S. frittered away a chance to end the war quickly, increasing casualties on both sides, because they "knew" that the opposition to the war wasn't strong enough to bring it to a halt.

[Tedward]

In holding out to get a better deal, the country would have been dissected and pummelled before invasion. One of those tasked would have been 617, masters of taking apart infrastructure and up until the A bomb, they had dropped the largest ever made to great effect. The country would have been in dire straights come signing on the dotted line.

[mako88sb]

Agreed. I must admit to flip flopping on this issue over the years but ultimately, the dropping of the bombs saved lives, not just American but Japanese as well. You just need to see how they fought on Iwo Jima & Okinawa to understand what was in store for anybody invading Japan. It really boggles the mind when you consider that the USA had adopted a "Europe first" strategy after Pearl Harbor. Can you imagine how the Pacific war would of went had it got top priority?

While I can't disagree with your assessment of how the Pacific theater would have been effected, I do agree with the Europe first policy.  Whether or not the US should have entered the war earlier was directly a result of the isolationist mood here.  When we finally did enter the war England was the LAST country to be standing so to speak.  Had England succumbed to an invasion, the war perhaps would have been longer and more drawn out, same result though.  So the "political" direction was Europe first, while supplying the Pacific with enough resources to prevent further Japanese advances.  Of course this had the negative aspect of letting them prepare their defenses.  Additionally the German/Italian armies were larger than the Japanese, but would ultimately be faced with much larger forces once Germany attacked Russia.   Hitler in essence did what a more concentrated effort in the Pacific required, splitting your forces in two.

Sorry. I didn't mean to imply that was the preferred way to go. Anyway, Chew's interesting link does show that the European First strategy wasn't written in stone. I guess the only thing I would add about the article is that it mentions 70% of the ships was in the Pacific. Given the nature of that theater, I would think that should of been expected.

Something else I didn't know about until fairly recently was just how involved the B-29 program was. It ended up costing the equivalent of the Manhattan project. 

[bknight]

Sorry. I didn't mean to imply that was the preferred way to go. Anyway, Chew's interesting link does show that the European First strategy wasn't written in stone. I guess the only thing I would add about the article is that it mentions 70% of the ships was in the Pacific. Given the nature of that theater, I would think that should of been expected.

Something else I didn't know about until fairly recently was just how involved the B-29 program was. It ended up costing the equivalent of the Manhattan project.

Yes it was early failure prone aircraft, that developed operational functions long after the first planes arrived.  The engines were a problem and crews took 2-3 days to replace them.  After a little training and ingenuity this time was drastically reduced.  It went obsolete with the advent of jets, even though it continued service into the Korean conflict.  I can't remember the exact quantities, but the Russian flown MIG-15 shot down 12(?) in one day.  The air force quit flying the B-29's until the F-86 were in operational strength to provide air coverage.  They cost over $.5 M per plane.

[VQ]

It's also certainly true that the targets chosen were civilian targets.  Deliberately so.  They were looking for a target that hadn't really been bombed yet, which left out all the truly military targets.

In the cold war era there were/are nuclear missile base targets that allow nuclear strike plans that at least nominally distinguish between "counterforce" (military targets) and "countervalue" (civilians and infrastructure). I am not sure this was really the case in Japan in 1945, particularly given the inherent inaccuracy of aerial bombing and Japanese manufacturing adaptions to the conventional strategic bombing campaign. Seems analogous to the destruction of Royan and Dresden.

Have you read Truman's diary about authorizing the bombings? Do you think he was lying to himself (or perhaps aware that it would one day become public)? My interpretation has always been that he really did not understand how powerful the weapon was.

http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=3&psid=1186

[gillianren]

I've read a quote (can't remember from whom, but it was someone high up in the process) that Truman was like a small boy on a big toboggan--he could neither stop it nor turn it.  Remember that he didn't even know the Manhattan Project existed until FDR died.  I don't think he knew.  I think the casualty projections he was given were inflated, whether deliberately or otherwise, to make the bombing seem more necessary than it was.  Maybe the people who did that believed them, or maybe they believed that the only option was bombing for other reasons.  But I don't think Truman had a whole lot of choice on a personal level.

[bknight]

I've read a quote (can't remember from whom, but it was someone high up in the process) that Truman was like a small boy on a big toboggan--he could neither stop it nor turn it.  Remember that he didn't even know the Manhattan Project existed until FDR died.  I don't think he knew.  I think the casualty projections he was given were inflated, whether deliberately or otherwise, to make the bombing seem more necessary than it was.  Maybe the people who did that believed them, or maybe they believed that the only option was bombing for other reasons.  But I don't think Truman had a whole lot of choice on a personal level.

There may have been an inflated causuaty figure given.  Being an ex army (field artillery,I think like  me) he most likely would have taken the course  of action that would reduce causlties of Allied forces.  However  the decision  must have been a heavy  one for him, or any rational person in the same position.

[raven]

It must have seemed like something out of science fiction. It would be like if someone showed up and said, "We have a working Alcubierre drive, sir."

[BazBear]

From what I've read, the biggest problem with the terms offered by Japan wasn't about them keeping their Emperor, it was the fact that they continued to insist on no occupation by the Allies, as well as trying their own war criminals. That wasn't going to happen. The atomic bombings were unfortunate, but so was the whole damned bloody war.